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Abstract
This Note will present the arguments for and against foreign direct investment, but assess the
Pemex reforms under the assumption that reform through privatization is necessary for survival.
This Note will examine the likelihood of success for the recently proposed Pemex reforms, and
what the Mexican government may expect with regards to Pemex’s future. Part I provides an
introduction to FDI and the legal and political framework that President Calderon must work in to
accomplish Pemex reforms. Part II presents two financial models for energy reform that may serve
as a blueprint for Pemex: 1) Mexico’s electric power deregulatory scheme, and 2) the Brazilian
oil sector’s gradual privatization. In light of all these considerations, Part III will outline a reform
model that can be applied to Pemex’s delicate political-economic status.

NOTE
THE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR
Martin Miranda
INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 2008, riot police in Mexico City surrounded
the Senate offices to restrain protesters as Mexican lawmakers
voted to increase private activity in the state-controlled oil
monopoly Petr6leos Mexicanos ("Pemex").' After years of
declining oil production from Pemex, Mexican President Felipe
Calder6n and his conservative National Action Party ("PAN") are
fighting to win public support to revive Pemex through
agreements with foreign oil companies.2 Former presidential
candidate Andr6s Manuel L6pez Obrador, who narrowly lost the
2006 election by only half a percent (approximately 240,000
votes), 3 is President Calder6n's harshest critic.4 As Mexico City's
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to graciously thank the Fordham International Law
Journal,especially former board members Kate Napalkova, Louis Abrams, Adam Masser,
and Annie Chen for their contributions. The Leitner Center for International Law and
Justice also deserves special recognition for providing me the opportunity to intern in
Mexico City. This Note is dedicated to the remarkable people I had the privilege to meet
in Mexico City who provided me the inspiration to write this Note.
1. See Ken Ellingwood, Mexican Senate Passes Legislation to Overhaul Oil Industry, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at A4 (summarizing the political unrest leading up to the vote on
the energy reform bill); see also loan Grillo, Opening Up Mexico's Oil to Foreigners: A First
31,
2008,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
TIME.COM,
Oct.
Step,
0,8599,1855621,00.html?xid=rss-world (analyzing the October 2008 Petr6leos Mexicanos
("Pemex") reforms).
2. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (describing the rationale behind President
Calder6n's Pemex reforms); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (noting the political obstacles to
Pemex reform).
3. See James C. McKinley Jr., Mexican Court Rejects Election Fraud Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at A1O (depicting the political implications of the Mexican federal
court's decision not to pursue Mr. Obrador's voter fraud allegations); see also Hector
Tobar & Sam Enriquez, Caldrer6n Moves Closer to Victory in Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2006, at Al (describing the severity of protests in Mexico City demanding a recount in
the presidential election).
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former mayor, and de facto leader of the opposition party, the
Democratic Revolution Party ("PRD"), Mr. Obrador mobilized
the massive street protest to thwart the President's plans, which
he claims will lead to Pemex's total privatization.5 President
Calder6n claims Pemex is not being privatized but
strengthened. 6 The President's plan would prevent foreign direct
investment ("FDI") in oil exploration activities; however, some
critics believe Pemex's fate will inevitably depend
on Mexico's
7
ability to attract FDI with foreign oil companies.
Mexico is the world's sixth largest petroleum producer, but
its oil reserves fell by twenty-five percent from 2002 to 2007,8 and
many believe that Mexico's oil production reached its historical
peak in 2004.' Pemex pays over sixty percent of its US$77 billion
in revenue to the Mexican government through royalties and
taxes, which accounts for forty percent of the federal
government's annual budget.1 l This leaves Pemex with little left4. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (detailing Mr. Obrador's hard-line position against
the October Pemex reforms); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (discussing Mr. Obrador's calls
for protest to pressure Mexican lawmakers to vote against the October Pemex
legislation).
5. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (describing the opposition party's concerns over
allowing increased private activity in Mexico's oil sector); see also Grillo, supra note I
(stating Mr. Obrador's position as a left-wing hardliner in Mexico's political arena).
6. SeeJason Beaubien, Change Proposedfor Mexican Oil Monopoly in Crisis, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, May 21, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90402097
(describing the political exchanges between President Calder6n and the opposition
party over the President's initial proposal in the Spring of 2008); see also Norma
Gutierrez, Mexico: Historic Reform of Petrleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and Approval of Renewable
and SustainableEnergy Bills, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.loc.gov/
lawweb/servlet/llocnews?disp3_763_text (providing President Calder6n's stated intent
for his Pemex reform proposal in the Spring of 2008).
7. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (addressing the concerns of critics who believe the
Pemex reforms do not go far enough to encourage foreign companies to work with
Pemex); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (suggesting that Pemex's current economic status
requires more substantive reforms).
8. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (explaining Pemex's oil producing capacity); see also
Marla Dickerson, Woes Mount for Mexico's State Oil Titan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at C1
(describing Pemex as leading global oil producer).
9. See Dickerson, supra note 8 (illustrating the extent of Pemex's recent decline in
oil production); see also Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Proposes Limited Overhaul of State Oil
Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at C2 (examining Pemex's future oil production
estimates).
10. See Symposium, Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation, and
Regulation, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 58 (2001) (outlining the extent of the Mexican
government's financial control over Pemex); see also Ellingwood, supra note 1
(illustrating the high level of taxes Pemex pays to the Mexican government).
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over capital to drill for new oil and develop deep-sea exploration
technologies." To compound matters, there is a shortage of
refineries, and Mexico must import nearly forty percent of its
gasoline, which costs US$1 billion each year. 12 As of March 2007,
Pemex's total consolidated debt was just over US$52 billion. 3
Pemex is Mexico's largest employer, biggest taxpayer, and a most
generous provider of social services. 14 It has built housing,
schools, and health clinics in some of the nation's poorest
areas.15 The decisions over Pemex's future will affect nearly every
Mexican citizen.
The Mexican Constitution allows Pemex to enter into
service contracts with foreign companies to perform petroleum
related activities, but incentive-based performance contracts are
not permitted. 6 Many experts say the only hope to save Pemex is
to find new sources of oil in the Gulf of Mexico, but Pemex lacks
the knowledge and expertise, and needs outside help to bring in
new technology for deep-water exploration. 7 The United States,
which is seeking to end its dependence on the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), would be an ideal
11. See Thomas Black & Andres R. Martinez, Pemex Missteps Pare Oil Revenues, Pave
Way for PetrobrasEntry, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 31, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601109&refer=news&sid=a7pcyPC6LgXk
(highlighting
the diverging
interests developing between Pemex and the Mexican government); see also Hector
Tobar, Calder6n Seeks Overhaul of Mexico's Oil Firm, L.A. TIMES, April 9, 2008, at A3 (stating
President Calder6n's belief that Mexico lacks the resources to finance its own oil sector
modernization).
12. See Ewell E. MurphyJr., The Prospects for FurtherEnergy Privatizationin Mexico, 36
TEX. INT'L LJ. 75, 80 (2001) (explaining the economic effect of Pemex's recent
shortcomings); see also Malkin, supra note 9 (pointing to Mexico's lack of refineries to
illustrate Pemex's poor investment strategy).
13. See James Crombie, Pemex Rebuffs Critics, LATINFINANCE, June 2007, at 5
(forecasting the likelihood Pemex will increase their debt in the future); see also Marla
Dickerson, Oil Find in Mexico Far From Success, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at C1
(attributing a large portion of Pemex's losses to the interest payments on their debt).
14. See Danielle Homant, Mexico: Constitutionaland PoliticalImplications of the 1995
Gas Regulations, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 233, 240 (suggesting that Pemex's
increasing tax burdens could affect their ability to assist poor communities); see also
Tobar, supra note 11 (underscoring Pemex's pervasive role in Mexican society).
15. See Homant, supra note 14, at 240 (noting Pemex's traditional practice of
providing health and education related programs to poor communities); see also Tobar,
supra note 11 (listing several public works programs coordinated by Pemex).
16. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
17. See Black & Martinez, supra note 11 (addressing Pemex's need to partner with
foreign companies for deep water drilling technology); see also Tobar, supra note 11
(summarizing Calder6n's belief that Pemex needs to partner with foreign companies to
prevent further oil production decline in the future).
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candidate for Mexico to seek foreign investments to discover and
18
produce oil while helping to modernize the Mexican oil sector.
Instead of developing this relationship with the United States,
Pemex focuses principally on its domestic market in fear of
becoming too economically dependent on the United States and
losing tens of billions of barrels in Mexican oil reserves.1 9 With oil
prices fluctuating dramatically in the wake of the 2008 world
financial crisis, 20 and without new major discoveries of crude
oil,2 1 Pemex's financial health appears to be in serious jeopardy.
This Note will present the arguments for and against FDI,
but assess the Pemex reforms under the assumption that reform
through privatization is necessary for its survival. This Note will
examine the likelihood of success for the recently proposed
Pemex reforms, and what the Mexican government may expect
with regards to Pemex's future. Part I provides an introduction to
FDI and the legal and political framework that President
Calder6n must work in to accomplish Pemex reforms. Part II
presents two financial models for energy reform that may serve as
a blueprint for Pemex: (1) Mexico's electric power deregulatory
scheme, and (2) the Brazilian oil sector's gradual privatization.
This Part will also discuss the dangers of expropriation that
18. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") is comprised of
Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela, which have all agreed to coordinate the their
production and set the price of oil worldwide. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 80
(illustrating the economic potential of a relationship between Mexico and the United
States in the oil sector); see also Cody Miller, Petroleum Exports from Latin America to the
United States, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 819, 824, 832 (2004) (depicting Mexico as one of
the largest non-OPEC oil producing countries in the world).
19. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 80 (predicting the potential losses Mexico faces by
refusing to provide incentive-based contracts for foreign oil companies); see also
Catherine Malkin, Output Fallingin Oil-Rich Mexico, and Politics Gets the Blame, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2007, at C3 (explaining how foreign companies with deepwater exploration
technology have made discoveries in the region neighboring Pemex in the Gulf of
Mexico).
20. See The Outlook for the Oil Price: Bust and Boom, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2009, at 71
(explaining how the volatility of oil prices are making oil companies cautious about
future investments); see also The Global Petroleum Perspective, APS REV. OIL MARKET
TRENDS, June 1, 2009, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Global+
Petroleum+Perspective.-a0201853331
(discussing OPEC's
strategy
to stabilize
international oil prices).
21. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (citing oil specialists who believe Pemex needs
deep-water exploration technology to make new oil discoveries); see also Malkin supra
note 19 (explaining that Pemex lacks the deepwater exploration technology to make
new oil discoveries).
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politically unstable countries pose to foreign investors, and how
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") may help
to mitigate those risks. In light of all these considerations, Part III
will outline a reform model that can be applied to Pemex's
delicate political-economic status. This Note then revisits the
legal and political obstacles that stand in the President's way, and
provides an outlook on the potential consequences of oil reform
in Mexico. Finally, this Note argues that, if the Mexican
government wants long-term sustainable revenue from Pemex in
the future, it must allow foreign companies to either renovate
Pemex's facilities through concession contracts, or produce oil
on their own account under a restructured Mexican regulatory
regime.
I.

LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OFPEMEXAND
MEXICO'S ENERGY SECTOR

This Part begins by outlining the prospects and pitfalls of
FDI. It also describes the views held by oil-producing Latin
American countries towards FDI, and then explains the
development of the constitutional provisions governing Mexico's
oil sector. This Part concludes by outlining President Calder6n's
initial reform proposal and its subsequent revisions in order to
pass congress.
A.

ForeignDirect Investment in the Latin American Oil Sector

Foreign direct investment is generally defined as the transfer
of assets from one country to another in order to generate wealth
for the owner of those assets.2 2 While FDI faces tough opposition
in a number of countries, it allows underdeveloped nations to
seek capital outside their borders to modernize their
infrastructure and introduce new technology, which in turn
creates a larger tax base to expand public services and provide
valuable training to local industries.2 3 On the other hand, FDI
22. See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK, at xix-xx

(1997) (defining Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") and explaining its characteristics);
see also M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 4 (2004)
(introducing the general characteristics of FDI).
23. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 22, at xix-xx (discussing the interaction
between international law, and the political risk to foreign investments); see alsoJoshua
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can create incentives for corruption, overwhelm local
competitors in their own markets, and encroach on a host
government's ability to respond to economic crisis. 24 History has
shown this double-edged sword as cutting in both directions. In
the 1980s, FDI helped boost the "Four Asian Tiger" economies,
but also contributed to political instability in many Latin
American countries as they defaulted on their escalating debts.2
For this reason, some of the strongest opposition to FDI
resonates in Latin America, especially over oil, one of the world's
most lucrative and depleted resources. In 2006, Bolivian
President Evo Morales sent soldiers to foreign-owned oil facilities
and threatened to expropriate them unless they renegotiated
their contracts to surrender control over the chain of
production. 26 Venezuela also took steps to place oil properties
under government control by raising taxes on foreign-owned
companies that had entered into lease agreements with the prior
government. 27 Forced contract modifications are not exclusive to
leftist regimes in Latin America, and most oil resources are based
on some form of state ownership. 8 For example, in 2006 the U.S.
House of Representatives voted in favor of renegotiating for
Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligation in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI
INT'L & COMP L. REV. 403, 408 (2006) (describing some of the benefits to FDI).
24. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under InternationalLaw, 10 DUKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 414 n.301 (2000) (explaining the potentiality for government
corruption by a host country receiving FDI); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The
Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469, 481-84 (2000)
(discussing the effects of foreign investment on a host country's economy).
25. The Four Asian Tigers refer to the economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan. These countries enjoyed rapid industrialization and high growth
rates from the 1960s to the 1990s. See Toyoo Gyohten, The Global Capital Market: What
Next: East Asian CapitalMarkets, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 371 (1997) (highlighting the
East Asian economies that experienced rapid growth beginning in the 1970s); see also
KennethJ. Vandevelde, A BriefHistory of InternationalInvestment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 177 (2005) (referring to the success of the East Asian economies
to demonstrate the benefits of FDI).
26. See Paulo Prada, Bolivian Nationalizes the Oil and Gas Sector, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2006, at A9 (presenting President Morales' oil nationalization policy); see also PatrickJ.
McDonnell, Bolivian Leader Nationalizes Fuel Industry, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A21
(surveying the international reaction to Bolivia's oil nationalization plan).
27. See infra Part IL.C.
28. See Peter Charles Coharis, U.S. Courts and the InternationalLaw of Expropriation:
Toward a New Model for Breach of Contract, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that
government regulation in the oil sector is common); see also, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews,
Vote in House Seeks to Erase Oil Windfall, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at Al (citing an
example of U.S. government regulation over domestic oil reserves).
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higher royalties from oil companies drilling in U.S. territory in
the Gulf of Mexico.2 9 The bill passed 252-165, including sixtyseven Republicans voting in favor of the bill.3"
While Pemex remains a vital source of revenue for the
Mexican government and powerful symbol of Mexican
sovereignty, the opposition to foreign investment and private
activity is leaving the oil sector with an aging infrastructure and
declining production. 31 President Calder6n's initial proposal
would have allowed Pemex to create risk-contracts with foreign
companies to provide their drilling and exploration expertise to
help offset declining oil production. 32 Facing strong opposition,
President Calder6n rescinded the controversial measure, instead
promising to revive Pemex through gradual reform to avoid a
constitutional challenge in the courts.33
The Mexican people have reason to distrust private investors
seeking access to Mexico's nationalized industries. The Mexican
government
previously mishandled
the nation's
bank
privatization, allegedly riddled with backroom deals, which cost
Mexican taxpayers an estimated US$65 billion. 34 Charges of
corruption and crony capitalism are prevalent throughout
Mexico's history, from the pre-revolutionary corruption of the

29. See Coharis, supra note 28, at 2 (using the U.S. as an example of an
industrialized Western country increasing government regulation in their oil sector); see
also Andrews, supra note 28 (explaining the politics behind the U.S. Congress's vote and
the oil companies' reaction).
30. See Coharis, supra note 28, at 2 (reporting the voting results of the U.S.
Congress's decision to renegotiate for higher royalties in the oil sector); see also Andrews,
supranote 28 (reporting on the U.S. Congress's vote to increase royalties).
31. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 81 (stating that Pemex's recent economic
challenges stem from its inadequate infrastructure); see also Black & Martinez, supra
note 11 (illustrating the negative effects of Pemex's tax obligations).
32. See Beaubien, supra note 6 (summarizing the desired effects of President
Calder6n's initial proposal); see also Tobar, supra note 11 (outlining President
Calder6n's initial goals for Pemex reforms).
33. See Grillo, supra note 1 (explaining that Calder6n's final reform bill
disappointed foreign oil companies' expectations); see also Gutierrez, supra note 6
(outlining the final provisions of the energy reform bill).
34. See James A. Dement Jr., Production and Distribution of Electric Power in Mexico:
Today and Tomorrow, 8 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 43, 46 (2000) (discussing the National Action
Party's criticism of the Institutional Revolution Party's ("PRI") missteps in implementing
prior privatization plans towards nationalized industries); see also Maria Dickerson,
Mexico's Stubborn Lack of Choices, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at Cl (explaining how
Mexico's policies have led to the prevalence of oligopolies in Mexican society).
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Porfirio Diaz regime, 35 to the misappropriation of Pemex funds
36

toward campaign budgets in the 2000 presidential election.
Mexicans also frequently point to Carlos Slim, the Mexican
businessman who made billions of dollars from the privatization
of the national phone company, Teltfonos de Mexico, as the
most recent example of the Mexican government's failure to
consider the larger Mexican population's interest when
deregulating major industries.3 7 Given the government's history
of mishandling prior deregulatory schemes, President Calder6n's
Pemex reforms were facing an uphill battle for public support
before they were even announced.
B.

ConstitutionalProvisions GoverningMexican Oil

Since the end of the Mexican Revolution in 1917, oil
nationalization has symbolized Mexico's national policy toward
economic development as government leaders gradually reduced
foreign activity in Mexico's natural resources.38 Disagreements
over labor and tax laws prompted Mexican President Lizaro
Cdrdenas 39 to expropriate all foreign-owned oil companies to
create Pemex in 1938.40 Since 1938, only Pemex, under direct
control of the Mexican government, is permitted to produce
Mexico's oil.4 1
35. President from 1876 to 1880 and 1884 to 1911. See MICHAEL S. WERNER,
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEXICO 166 (2001).
36. See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico's Approach to ExpropriationDisputes
in the Face of Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. REV. 35, 46-47 (2003) (observing the
political cronyism prevalent throughout Mexico's history); see also Richard Bourdeax, Fox
Targets Graft in Mexico Monopoly, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at Al (detailing the
difficulties that former President Fox faced during his campaign to challenge the PRI's
corrupt ties to the oil sector and trade unions).
37. Beaubien, supra note 6 (describing Mr. Slim's large profits from the
privatization deal); see also Luisa Kroll, Billionaires 2008, FORBES, Mar. 24, 2008, at 80
(providing an annual list of the world wealthiest individuals).
38. See Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFIJA Investment Chapterand Foreign DirectInvestment
in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 283-87 (1994)
(summarizing Mexico's role as a leading voice addressing foreign direct investment's
potentially exploitative nature); see also Homant, supra note 14, at 235 (describing
Mexico's post-revolutionary attitude towards foreign influence).
39. President from 1934-1940. See WERNER, supra note 35, at 64.
40. See Homant, supra note 14, at 235 (describing the events leading up to Pemex's
creation); cf Murphy, supra note 12, at 76 (providing the history of events leading to
Mexico's current oil challenges).
41. See Kenneth S. Culotta, Recipe for a Tex-Mex Pipeline Project: Considerations in
Permitting a Cross-Border Gas Transportation Project, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 287, 291 (2004)
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In conjunction with Pemex's inception, the Mexican
Congress adopted Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which42
declares Mexico's exclusive ownership of all subsoil resources.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Pemex granted exploration
contracts that provided compensation based a percentage of
production; however, this became illegal under the 1958
Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27 on Petroleum
("Petroleum Law of 1958").43 Articles 25 and 28 of the Mexican
Constitution underpin the Petroleum Law of 1958. 44 Article 25
provides that the public sector has exclusive control over
strategic areas indicated in paragraph four of Article 28 .4 Article

(describing Pemex's monopoly position in the Mexican oil sector since 1938); see also
Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at 58
(providing the history of Mexico's oil sector dating back to the 1920s).
42. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
art. 27, para. 4, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
The article states :
The Nation has direct ownership of all natural resources of the continental
shelf and the submarine shelf of the islands; all minerals or substances that are
in veins, layers, or masses; beds of ore that constitute deposits naturally distinct
form the components of the earth itself, such as the minerals from which
industrial metals and metalloids are derived; deposits of precious stones; rock
salt, and the salt deposits formed by sea water; products derived from the
decomposition of rocks when subterranean works are required for their
extraction; mineral or organic deposits of materials susceptible of utilization as
fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and all solid, liquid and gaseous
hydrocarbons; and the space above the national territory, to the extent and
within the terms established by international law.
Id., translated in [12 Const. of the Countries of the World] Mex. Const. 3/08, at 19-20
(Mar. 2008).
43. See Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo
[Petroleum Law of 1958] as amended, art. 6 para. 1, D.O., 29 de Noviembre de 1958,
(Mex.), translated in [2 Treaty Material] N. Am. Free Trade Agreements (Oxford Univ.
Press) Booklet 21, at 2 (Apr. 2006) ("Petr6leos Mexicanos may sign the contracts of
works with a corporation or with a private person in order to better performance of its
activities. The payment of those contracts will always be in cash and in no case shall
percentages be based in the products, nor participation in the results of the exploitation
be granted for the services that are lent or the works that are executed."); see Murphy,
supra note 12, at 76 (providing a historical overview of Pemex's relationship with foreign
companies).
44. See Petroleum Law of 1958, art. 2 (Mex.), translated in [2 Treaty Material] N.
Am. Free Trade Agreements (Oxford Univ. Press) Booklet 21, at 2 (Apr. 2006) ("Only
the State may carry out the different types of exploitation of hydrocarbon that constitute
the oil industry within the terms of the following article.").
45. See Const (Mex.). art. 25, para. 4, translatedin [12 Const. of the Countries of the
World] Mex. Const. 3/08, at 17 (Mar. 2008) ("The public sector will have the exclusive
responsibility over the strategic areas indicated in Article 28, paragraph four of the
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28, paragraph four, refers to petroleum and other hydrocarbons,
basic petrochemicals, and electricity as strategic areas within the
exclusive functions of the state.4 6 The Petroleum Law of 1958
gave a broad view of the petroleum sector to include the
exploration, exploitation, refining, transportation, storage,
distribution, and initial sale of petroleum.4 7 This law further
solidified Pemex's privileged position as the sole agent for the
Mexican government's exploitation of Mexican oil.4 8
The most significant development since 1958 came in 1992
with the Pemex Organic Law, which restructured Pemex into
four decentralized entities: (1) exploration and production; (2)
refining; (3) gas and basic petrochemicals; and (4) secondary
petrochemicals. 49 The fourth entity created by the Pemex
Constitution. The Federal Government shall always maintain the ownership and control
over any organization that are established for this purpose.").
46. See id. art. 28, para. 4, translated in [12 Const. of the Countries of the World]
Mex. Const. 3/08, at 27 (Mar. 2008) ("The functions that the State exclusively exercises
in the following strategic areas shall not constitute monopolies: postal delivery,
telegraphs, and radio telegraphy; petroleum and other hydrocarbons; basic
petrochemicals; radioactive minerals and the generation of nuclear energy; electric
power and activities expressly provided by the laws enacted by the Congress of the
Union.").
47. See Petroleum Law of 1958, art. 3, para. 2, translated in [2 Treaty Material] N.
Am. Free Trade Agreements (Oxford Univ. Press) Booklet 21, at 1 (Apr. 2006) ("The oil
industry embraces: The exploration, exploitation, manufacture and direct sale of gas as
well as the transportation and the indispensable and necessary storage to interconnect
its exploitation and manufacture.").
48. See Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra
note 10, at 58 (underscoring Pemex's historically privileged monopoly status in the oil
sector); see also Culotta, supra note 41, at 288 (detailing Pemex's dominating political
and economic presence since 1938).
49. See Ley Orgfinica de Petr6leos Mexicanos y Organismos Subsidiarios [Organic
Act of Petr6leos Mexicanos and its Subsidairy Bodies], as amended, art. 3, D.O., 16 de
Julio de 1992 (Mex.). The law states:
The following decentralized technical, industrial and commercial character,
are created with legal status and their own assets, and will have the following
objectives:
exploitation;
exploration,
and Production:
I.PEMEX-Exploration
transportation, storage and commercialization of oil and natural gas;
II.PEMEX-Refining: industrial refining process; manufacture of oil and
oil derived products that serve as basic industrial raw materials;
storage, transportation, distribution, commercialization of the
mentioned products;
IIIPEMEX-Gas and Basic Petrochemicals: processing of natural gas,
liquids natural and artificial gas; storage, transportation, distribution,
commercialization of these hydrocarbons, as well as of derived
products that serve as basic industrial raw materials; and
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Organic Law was no longer considered a "strategic area"
exclusive to the Mexican State in response to the needs of
domestic and international markets.5" The Foreign Investment
Law of 1993 ("FIL") further relaxed the state's control over the
petroleum sector by providing a framework for foreign investors
to provide services related to transportation, distribution, and
storage of natural gas through service contracts.5" Foreign
investors can now build, operate, and own pipelines, facilities and
equipment; however, the FIL did not provide production and
exploration risk-sharing activities in the oil sector to foreign
investors.

C.

52

CurrentPemex Legislation Under the Calder6n Administration

In the spring of 2008, President Calder6n introduced a bill
that his party believes will revive Pemex. 53 President Calder6n's
proposal included incentive-based contracts for deepwater
exploration, partnerships for deepwater drilling, and allowed
private companies to retain ownership of refineries they build
within Mexico's borders.54 This proposal also sought to shake up
Pemex's corporate structure to give it more autonomy from the
IV.PEMEX-Petrochemical: industrial petrochemical processes whose
products are not part of the basic petrochemical industry, as well as
their storage, distribution, and commercialization.
Id., translatedin [2 Treaty Material] N. Am. Free Trade Agreements (Oxford Univ. Press)
Booklet 20, at 1-2 (Apr. 2006).
50. See id., art. 3, § IV.
51. Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera [Foreign Investment Law], as amended, art. 8, §§ XXI, D.O., 27 de Diciembre de 1993 (Mex.). The law states:
A favorable resolution by the Commission is required for foreign investment to
participate in a percentage higher than 49% in the economic activities and
corporations mentioned herein:
X. Construction of pipelines for the transporting oil and its derivatives;
and
XI. Drilling of oil and gas wells.
Id., translatedin 33 I.L.M. 212, 215 (1994).
52. Id.; see Homant, supra note 14, at 249 (describing that the Foreign Investment
Law ("FIL") is generally vague, and only specific in permitting foreign companies to
engage in distribution related activities in the hydrocarbon sector).
53. See Beaubien, supra note 6 (introducing President Calder6n's initial Pemex
reform proposal); see also Tobar, supra note 11 (addressing the main provisions set out in
President Calder6n's proposal).
54. See Beaubien, supra note 6 (discussing the provisions in Mr. Calder6n's initial
Pemex reform proposal); see also Energy Reform in Mexico: Crude and Oily, ECONOMIST, July
26, 2008, at 46 (reporting on the ensuing debate regarding President Calder6n's initial
energy reform proposal).
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government." However the proposal stopped short of allowing
risk-sharing contracts with foreign companies or allowing a share
in the discovery and production of oil.5 6
In late October of 2008, the Mexican Senate Energy
Committee passed seven bills that allow Pemex to pay foreign
57
companies to explore and produce oil based on performance.
These bills prevent Pemex from making profit-sharing
agreements with foreign companies as well, to avoid a
constitutional challenge in the courts under Articles 27 and 28.58
Contrary to President Calder6n's initial proposal,59 foreign
companies are not allowed to build and own refineries.
Critics claim these reforms fail to seriously address the
concern over declining oil production. 60 However, government
officials in Calder6n's party who once viewed oil reform as a
55. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (outlining President Calder6n's more ambitious
reform goals in his initial proposal); see also Energy Reform in Mexico: Crude and Oily, supra
note 54 at 46 (highlighting President Calder6n's major provisions in the proposal).
56. See Grillo, supra note 1 (noting the limitations on foreign activity that would
remain under President Calder6n's proposal); see also Gutierrez, supra note 6 (stating
President Calder6n's intentions for Pemex to remain solely owned by the Mexican
government).
57. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo
[Petroleum Law of 1958], as amended, D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley de
Petr6leos Mexicanos [Pemex Law], D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley de
Obras Pfiblicas y Servicios Relacionados con las Mismas [Public Works and Related
Services Law], as amended, D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley de Adquisiciones
Arrendamientos y Servicios del Sector Pfiblico [Law of Public Acquisitions, Leases, and
Services], as amended, D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley de la Comisi6n
Reguladora de Energfa [Energy Regulatory Commission Law], as amended, D.O., 28 de
Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley de la Comisi6n Nacional de Hidrocarburos [National
Hydrocarbons Commission Law], D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); Ley para el
Aprovechamiento Sustentable de la Energia [Law for Sustainable Energy Consumption],
D.O., 28 de Noviembre de 2008 (Mex.); see also Ellingwood, supra note 1 (highlighting
the main provision of the legislation); see Grillo, supra note 1, (providing the general
purpose behind the Pemex reform legislation).
58. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (demonstrating President Calder6n's concern over
the constitutionality of the Pemex reforms); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (stating some of
the more ambitious goals for Pemex reform that the Mexican Constitution currently
prohibits).
59. See Ellingwood, supra note I (explaining the compromise to redact incentive
based contracts from his proposal to have the Pemex reforms passed by Congress); see
also Grillo, supra note 1 (noting some of the limitations on foreign activity that remain
after the October 2008 Pemex reform legislation).
60. See Ellingwood, supra note I (reporting an oil specialist's view that President
Caler6n's Pemex reforms did not sufficiently address Pemex's declining oil production);
see also Grillo supra note I (referring to an oil analyst who believes the current oil
reforms are inadequate and could lead to a further decline in oil production).
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"political third rail" applaud the President's ability to reform
Pemex at all. 61 They remain hopeful that these reforms forecast a
shift in the public perception towards Mexico's oil, and are
optimistic that these initial reforms will lead to more changes in
62
the following years.
II.

IMPLEMENTATION AND PROTECTION MODELS FOR FDI

Part I of this Note outlines the potential reform models for
President Calder6n to attract FDI in Mexico's oil sector. One
contemporary model, discussed in Part II.A, is the electric power
sector reforms implemented in Mexico in 1992.63 The Mexican
government passed these reforms with moderate success, and the
sector is gradually becoming more self-sufficient. 6' Part II.B will
then examine the gradual opening of Brazil's petroleum sector,
which encountered similar political obstacles that President
Calder6n currently faces, and may provide a second model for oil
reform. Using Venezuela as a case study, Part II.C will consider
the political risks for foreign investors, and the contractual
mechanisms to mitigate these dangers. Finally, Part II.D discusses
the Mexican government's cooperation under NAFTA, and
NAFTA's ability to protect FDI from inequitable expropriation.
A.

Mexico's Electric PowerSector Model

Over the last fifteen years, Mexico's electric power reform
has eased the government's financial obligations in the
previously nationalized sector. 65 The two prior Mexican
presidents sought to further deregulate the electric power sector
in gradual steps, while still keeping the sector under government
regulation. 66 Former President Vicente FOX6 7 presented the less
61. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (illustrating the political sensitivity over Pemex and
Mexico's oil sector); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (suggesting that the October 2008
Pemex legislation may have created the opportunity for Mexican politicians to discuss
Pemex reform more openly without suffering political backlash).
62. See Ellingwood, supra note 1 (noting the political importance of Pemex's
nationalized status); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (suggesting that the October 2008
Pemex legislation may reflect a sea change in the Mexican people's perception over
Mexico's oil).
63. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
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ambitious reform proposal of the two, but the Mexican Supreme
Court ultimately found the plan unconstitutional for violating
Article 27.6" The consequence of this ruling leaves many to
wonder whether anything short of a constitutional amendment of
Article 27 will provide the legal certainty that foreign companies
desire before making long-term investments in Mexico's energy
69
sector.
The electric power reforms in 1992 allowed private investors
to participate in two ways: through a build, lease, and transfer
scheme ("BLT"); or as an independent power producer
("IPP"). 7 ° Under the BLT model, a private investor finances the
power plant's construction and leases it to the Federal Electricity
Commission ("CFE") for twenty-five years. 7 ' Although the private
party initially finances the plant in the construction phase, the
CFE is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the
plant for the duration of the lease.72 At the conclusion of the
lease, ownership passes to the CFE.73 Under the IPP model, the
power plant is owned and operated by the private party, but is
required to sell the generated energy to the CFE for twenty-five
years at a previously established rate through a public bidding
process.74 These models have helped reduce public spending in
67. President from 2000 to 2006. See Encyclopoedia Britannica Online, Vicente Fox
Quesada,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/757093/Vicente-Fox
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2009).
68. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
70. See MIGUEL G. BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN MEXICO'S
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 4 (2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/economy/
mbinvest.en.pdf (introducing the build, lease, and transfer ("BLT") and independent
power producer ("IPP") foreign investment models for Mexico's electric power sector);
see also Energy and InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10,
at 60 (outlining the two different investment models for Mexico's electric power sector).
71. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 4 tbl.1 (describing the BLT model); see
also Energy and InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at
60 (describing the general BLT financial model).
72. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 4 tbl.1 (comparing the Federal
Electricity Commission's ("CFE's") role in the BLT and the independent power
producer model ("IPP")); see also Energy and InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation,and
Regulation, supra note 10, at 60 (explaining the CFE's role under the BLT model).
73. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 4 tbl.1 (explaining the final step in the
BLT investment model); see also Energy and InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation, and
Regulation, supra note 10, at 60 (detailing the drawback to foreign investors under the
BLT model).
74. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 4 tbl.1 (depicting the general IPP
investment model); see also Rogelio Lopez Velarde, A Step in the Right Direction?
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Mexico's electric power sector by allowing private parties to
undertake a large portion of the financing, and the Mexican
electric power sector is more self-sufficient as a result.75
A report prepared for the California Energy Commission
applauded Mexico's IPP program for its ability to attract foreign
investment while balancing the Mexican government's need to
provide a regulatory scheme that protects its electric power
sector.7 6 The private sector's share in Mexico's electric power
sector constitutes eighteen percent, and is projected to reach
nearly fifty percent by 2010. 77 Given the political sensitivity of the
oil sector, adopting a similar incremental approach to attract
foreign investment may provide a stable privatization model for
Pemex and ease the Mexican population's perceived threat to
their national sovereignty if oil production increases.
While these public-private financing models provide a
potential solution, it remains unclear just how far the Mexican
government is willing to expand this privatization model in the
electric power sector. To address this concern, former President
Ernesto Zedillo 7 8 proposed an initiative to the Mexican Congress
in February of 1999 to amend Articles 27 and 28 of the
Constitution, and permanently remove the legal framework
permitting the state's monopoly control over the electric power
sector.79 Under President Zedillo's plan, the CFE would have
granted thirty-year concessions to private companies to operate
power plants, but the government would still retain regulatory
Privatization of Natural Gas Services in Mexico and an Examination of the Burgeoning Role of
Local Distribution Companies, 8 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 37, 40 (2000) (providing an overview of
Mexican natural gas reform, which led to increased private activity in the sector).
75. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 6 fig.2 (projecting the percentage of
foreign activity in the Mexican electric power sector by 2010); see also Energy and
InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at 60 (examining
the effects of the BLT and the IPP models created after the 1992 power electricity
reforms).
76. See POWER PROJECT FIN., MEXICO ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING 7-8 (2002),
available
at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/cec-600-2 0 0 5-0 05/
cec-600-2005-005.pdf (praising the ability of IPP program's ability to attract investors).
77. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 5 (estimating the percentage of private
activity in the Mexican electric power by 2010).
78. President from 1994 to 2000. See WERNER, supra note 35, at 905.
79. See Emilio Carrillo Gamboa, Proposed Changesfor the Mexican Electric Industry, 20
ENERGY L.J. 281, 281 (1999) (noting former President Zedillo's proposed changes to the
electric power in 1999); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 95 (describing the economic
developments in the Mexican energy sector since the adoption of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")).
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the basic power network for national security
control over
80
purposes.
President Zedillo's proposal outlined a three-phase model
for the transition.8 ' During phase one, the CFE would remain
state controlled, but break into three separate entities:
generating, distribution, and transmission companies.8 2 The
government would also create a regulatory framework to
facilitate a competitive wholesale electric power market as a
precursor to a fully open market.8 3 In phase two, both foreign
and domestic private investors would be granted permission to
generate and sell directly to qualified users.84 The third and most
controversial phase called for the eventual privatization of the
CFE, but the government would still retain essential hydroelectric
plants. 5 President Zedillo's ambitious proposal symbolized the
broad vision of the Institutional Revolution Party ("PRI") during
the 1990s to privatize Mexico's largest industries previously
nationalized under their one-party rule.86 However, President
Zedillo was unable to forge the political will in Congress to
approve the proposal, as his party lost a number of congressional
seats from years of widespread corruption. 7 The proposal came
80. See Gamboa, supra note 79, at 283-84 (reviewing the three stages in President
Zedillo's 1999 energy reform); Murphy, supra note 12, at 95 (outlining President
Zedillio's 1999 energy reform proposal).
81. See Dement, supra note 34, at 44 (summarizing President Zedillo's three-phase
electric power sector reform proposal); Gamboa, supra note 79, at 283 (outlining
President Zedillo's three-step electric power sector reform proposal).
82. See Dement, supra note 34, at 44 (explaining the first phase of President
Zedillo's proposal); see also Gamboa, supra note 79, at 283 (describing the first phase of
President Zedillo's proposal).
83. See Dement, supra note 34, at 44 (describing the first phase of President
Zedillo's proposal); see also Gamboa, supra note 79, at 284 (explaining the first phase of
President Zedillo's proposal).
84. See Dement, supra note 34, at 45 (describing the second phase of President
Zedillo's proposal); see also Gamboa, supra note 79, at 284 (explaining the second phase
of President Zedillo's proposal).
85. See Dement, supra note 34, at 45 (describing the third phase of President
Zedillo's proposal); see also Gamboa, supra note 79, at 284 (explaining the third phase of
President Zedillo's proposal).
86. See Gamboa, supra note 79, at 281 (explaining that privatization initiatives
would be easily passed under a PRI majority-controlled Congress); see also Murphy, supra
note 12, at 77 (surveying the numerous privatization reforms in the 1990s under PRI
administrations).
87. See Victor C. Carre6n-Rodriguz et aL., The Mexican Electricity Sector: Economic,
Legal and PoliticalIssues, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POWER SECTOR REFORM 198 n.10
(David Victor & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2007) (explaining the motivations and strategies
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under intense scrutiny for attempting to remove the energy
sector from the government's "strategic areas" under Article 28,
as well as its encroachment on Congress' exclusive authority over
the CFE's ability to purchase electricity absent a public bidding
88
process.
After winning the 2000 election, President Vicente Fox
proposed creating an open electric power market for wholesale
consumers to alleviative the strain on public finances.89 This
proposal did not deviate far from President Zedillo's original
initiative, and the Mexican Supreme Court later invalidated it in
an eight-to-three decision. 90 Five of the eleven Supreme Court
justices found President Fox's proposed legislation contradicted
the "public service of electricity" language in Article 27,
paragraph 5, which prohibits any private generation of electricity
for public consumption. 9 The three other justices struck down

for reform in Mexico's electric power sector); see also Bourdeax, supra note 36 (reporting
on the efforts to cleanse Mexican politics of corruption).
88. See Carre6n-Rodrfguz et al., supra note 87, at 200 (explaining Congress'
concern that President Zedillo's reforms encroach on the traditional responsibilities of
the legislative branch); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 77 (describing the political
fallout after President Zedillo's proposal was struck down as unconstitutional).
89. See BRECEDA-LAPEYRE, supra note 70, at 2-3 (stating President Fox's desire to
establish a parallel electric power market to circumvent the public bidding process);
Murphy, supra note 12, at 81 (distinguishing President Fox's energy proposal from
President Zedillo's more ambitious plan for energy reform).
90. SERVICIO PUBLICO DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA. EL DECRETO QUE
REFORMA Y ADICIONA LOS ARTICULOS 126, PARRAFOS SEGUNDO Y TERCERO,
Y 135, FRACCION II Y PARRAFOS ANTEPENUJLTIMO, PENULTIMO Y ULTIMO, DEL
REGLAMENTO DE LA LEY RELATIVA, PUBLICADO EN EL DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA
FEDERACI6N EL VEINTICUATRO DE MAYO DE DOS MIL UNO, TRANSGREDE EL
NUMERAL 89, FRACCION 1, DE LA CONSTITUCI6N FEDERAL, AL DESVIRTUAR
LA NATURALEZA JURIDICA DE LAS FIGURAS DE AUTOABASTECIMIENTO Y DE
COGENERACION ESTABLECIDAS EN LA LEY QUE REGLAMENTA, PUES ALTERA
EL CONCEPTO DE "EXCEDENTES", LO QUE IMPLICA, ADEMS, APARTARSE DE
LOS PRINCIPIOS DE DIVERSO ARTiCULO 27 DE LA NORMA FUNDAMENTAL,
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [S.C.J.N.] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial
de la Federaci6n y su Gaceta, Novena Epoca, tomo XV, Mayo de 2002, Pigina 607
(Mex.), reprinted in D.O., 3 de Junio de 2002, [hereinafter Constitutional Controversy
22/2001]; see Murphy, supra note 12, at 81 (comparing President Fox's energy proposal
with President Zedillio's plan for energy reform).
91. See id.; see also Del Duca, supra note 36, at 131 n.536 (analyzing the Mexican
Supreme Court majority's ruling that President Fox's energy proposal violated Article 27
of the Mexican Constitution). Article 27 states in relevant part:
Furthermore, the Nation has the exclusive right to generate, conduct,
transform, distribute, and supply electric power to be used for public service.
No concessions for this purpose will be granted to private individuals, and the
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the initiative based on a separation of powers argument, ruling
that President Fox's reform exempted Congress' legislative intent
to require a public bidding process to purchase electricity under
Article 134 of the Constitution.9 2 This line of reasoning suggests
that the 1992 electricity reforms, based on a more flexible
statutory reading of the "public service of electricity" language,
would also violate the Constitution because they fail to provide a
public bidding process under congressional authority.9 3 The
court's ruling jeopardizes any further expansion by private
investors in the electric power sector, and questions the legality
of prior investment contracts worth hundreds of millions of
dollars.9 4 This leaves many to speculate whether anything short of

nation will make use of the property and natural resources required to achieve
these ends.
Const. art. 27 6 (Mex.), translated in [12 Const. of the Countries of the World] Mex.
Const. 3/08, at 21 (Mar. 2008).
92. See ConstitutionalControversy 22/2001, supra note 90; see also Del Duca, supra note
36, at 131 n.536 (analyzing the concurring conclusion that President Fox's energy
proposal encroached on the Mexican congress's authority to require a public bidding
process to govern foreign activity in the electric power sector). Article 134 of the
Mexican Constitution provides as follows:
The economic resources available to the Federal Government and the
Government of the Federal District as well as to their respective state
administrations will be administered with efficiency, effectiveness, and honor,
to satisfy the objectives to which they are destined.
All acquisitions, leases, and transfers of all classes of goods, provisions of
services of any nature, and the contracting of works that the government
undertakes shall be awarded or carried out through open bidding by means of
a public call so that solvent proposals may be freely submitted. The proposals
shall be presented as sealed bids, to be open publicly, so as to ensure to the
state the best conditions possible with regards to price, quality, financing,
opportunity, and other pertinent circumstances.
Const. art. 134 (Mex.), translated in [12 Const. of the Countries of the World] Mex.
Const. 3/08, at 113 (Mar. 2008).
93. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 131 (examining the consequences of the
Mexican Supreme Court's analysis concerning private activity in Mexico's electric power
sector); see also Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Turns to Investors to Add to Power Capacity, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at W1 (reporting on the impact of the court decision negating
President Fox's energy reform for foreign investors).
94. See Richard Lapper, Pemex: Change Is Needed, But Far from Easy, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 12, 2005, at 3 (discussing the difficulties to energy reform after the
Mexican supreme court invalidated President Fox's energy proposal); see also Malkin,
supra note 93 (reporting that the Mexican supreme court's ruling questions the
constitutionality of the 1992 electric power reforms).
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a constitutional amendment restricting the scope of Articles 27
95
and 28 will achieve substantive reform in the energy sector.
Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds vote in
Congress, accompanied by the approval of a majority of the
thirty-one state legislatures.9 6 Until President Fox's presidential
victory in 2000, the PRI's dominant presence in both the federal
and state governments reduced the amendment process to a
mere formality.9 7 While several moderates within the PRD have
joined the PAN to reform the oil sector, their left-wing coalition
is unwavering, and has additional support from the labor unions
and the PRI orthodoxy. 98 Mr. Obrador continues to oppose any
dilution of Pemex's monopoly, and the Pemex workers union will
fight any reform threatening to reduce their role in the oil
sector.9 9 Despite these challenges, President Calder6n has made
some progress by creating a dialogue over Pemex's future. Just as
the political battles in Brazil ultimately led to foreign
participation in their once nationalized oil sector,"' incremental
progress in Mexico may eventually provide enough financial
incentive for foreign companies to participate more substantially
with Pemex.
B.

Petrobrasas a Modelfor Reform

In the mid-1990s Brazil successfully opened its oil sector to
private companies through incremental reform and regulation,

95. See Lapper, supra note 94, at 3 (interviewing an oil expert at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico on his assessment on the prospects of energy sector
reform); see also Del Duca, supra note 36, at 133 (examining President Fox's decision to
include constitutional changes to Articles 27 and 28 in his next reform proposal).
96. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 106 (explaining the legal hurdles required to
achieve substantive energy reform); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 96 (explaining the
constitutional amendment process).
97. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 106 (explaining why it is now more difficult to
pass a constitutional amendment); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 81 (describing the
changing political landscape in Mexico and its effect on the political process).
98. See Black & Martinez, supra note 11 (explaining the division in the PRI over oil
reform); see also Grillo, supra note 1 (reporting about the political parties who stand for
and against the Pemex reforms).
99. See Black & Martinez, supra note 11 (illustrating the Pemex workers union's
political influence); see also Lapper, supra note 94, at 3 (describing the political clout of
Pemex's workers union and the political left in Mexico).
100. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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despite public concern over losing control of this vital sector. 1 1
The effect of these reforms ultimately kept the state-owned oil
company, Petr6leo Brasileiro ("Petrobras"), afloat during Brazil's
economic woes in the 1990s, and sustained Petrobras' viability in
the twenty-first century. 0 2 The Brazilian government was able to
address its need to attract foreign capital while still maintaining
significant control over the oil sector. 103 The Brazilian
government's handling of Petrobras within a political
environment analogous to Mexico may provide the Mexican
government a relevant model for oil reform. 4 In fact, Petrobras
recently expanded an already existing technology sharing
agreement with Pemex and has even given tours of its facilities to
Mexican lawmakers to show how the company has transformed
05
since allowing private investments in the Brazilian oil sector.'
In 1995 Brazil successfully passed constitutional reforms
necessary to attract foreign investment in its oil sector by allowing
10 6
the government to make concessions to private oil companies.

101. See Marilda Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, The New Oil and Gas Industry in Brazil: An
Overview of the Main Legal Aspects, 36 Tex. Int'l L.J. 141, 142-43 (2001) (illustrating the
political-economic environment during the implementation of privatized oil reform); see
also Energy and InternationalLaw: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at
63 (depicting challenges of privatizing a nationalized oil sector).
102. See Miller, supra note 18, at 838-39 (reporting on Petr6leo Brasileiro's
("Petrobras") production increases since 2003); see also Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, supra note
101, at 142 (noting Brazil's economic challenges in the 1990s).
103. SeeJohn E. Rhea, Privatizationin the InternationalPetroleum Industry: The Interplay
Between Politics, Economics, and Reliance, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 609, 631-32 (2005)
(providing some of the advantages to state-controlled industries); see also Miller, supra
note 18, at 843-44 (noting that Petrobras maintained control over some of the wells
given to private parties after the development stage).
104. See James Brooke, Brazil Takes Big Step Toward Ending State Monopoly over Oil,
N.Y TIMES, June 8, 1995, at A21 (describing the hostile political climate as Brazil's
Congress passed the constitutional amendment allowing foreign companies to
participate in Brazil's oil sector); see also Rhea, supra note 103, at 631-32 (comparing the
state-owned oil sectors of Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela).
105. See Malkin, supra note 19 (explaining that several foreign companies currently
have agreements with Pemex); see also Black & Martinez, supra note II (demonstrating
Petrobras' interest in seeing Pemex take similar steps to increase foreign participation in
Mexico's oil sector).
106. Constituigdo Federal [C.F.], as amended, art. 177 (Brazil). Specifically, article
177 of the Constitution reads:
The Union has a monopoly on the following areas:
I.
prospecting and exploitation of deposits of petroleum, natural gas
and other fluid hydrocarbons;
II. refining domestic or foreign petroleum;
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The amendment led to Petroleum Law 9478, allowing private oil
companies to bid for exploration and production rights in
territorial blocks offered by the government." 7 This law also
created the National Petroleum Agency ("ANP") to regulate
these private companies' activities."8 The law permitted the
III. importation or exportation of products and basic by-products
resulting from the activities set forth in the prior sub paragraphs;
IV. maritime transportation of crude oil of domestic origin or of basic
petroleum by-products produced in the Country, as well as the
pipeline transportation of crude oil, its by-products and natural gas
of whatever origin;
V. prospecting, mining enrichment, reprocessing, industrialization or
commerce in ores and nuclear minerals and their by-products, with
the exception of radioisotopes whose production, marketing and
utilization may be authorized under a permit regime, in accordance
with subparts b and c of subparagraph XXIII of the heading of art.
21 of this Federal Constitution.
1. The Union may contract with state or private firms to perform the
activities provided for in subparagraph I to IV of this article, observing the
conditions established by law.
2.
The law referred to in the first section shall provide for:
I.guarantee of furnishing petroleum by-products in the entire national
territory;
II.the conditions of contracting;
III.the structure and power of the agency regulating the Union's
monopoly;
3. The law shall provide for the transportation and use of radioactive
materials within the national territory.
C.F. art. 177 (Brazil), translatedin [3 Const. of the Countries of the World] Brazil Const.
9/08, at 140-41 (May 2008).
107. Decreto No. 9.478, de 6 de agosto de 1997, arts. 8(IV), 72, D.O.U., de
07.08.1997 (Brazil). Article 8(IV) states:
The purpose of the National Petroleum Agency ("ANP") will be to promote
regulatoion, contracting and supervision of the economic activities of the
petroleum industry, being responsible for: drafting invitations to bid and
conducting bidding process for exploration, development, and production
concessions; executing the respective contracts and supervising its
performance;
Id. art. 8(IV) translated in [2 Doing Business in Brazil] Law No. 9478 of Aug. 6, 1997
(Juris Publishing, Inc.) App. 2S, at 4 (Aug. 1997). Article 72 provides:
For a period of 5 years, from the date of enactment of the present law, the
Union shall assure, through the ANP, to the private refineries operating in the
country, as excluded from the Union monopoly according to Article 45 of the
Interim Constitutional Disposition, operational and economic conditions
based on prevailing criteria for payment of refining activity.
Id., translated in [2 Doing Business in Brazil] Law No. 9478 of Aug. 6, 1997 (Juris
Publishing, Inc.) App. 2S, at 18 (Aug. 1997); see also Rosado de Sa Ribeiro supra note
101, at 147 (explaining the Brazil's gradual four year legislative struggle to attract
foreign oil companies to participate with Petrobras).
108. See Decreto No. 9478, art. 7 & 72(11)-(111). Article 7 states:
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Brazilian government to break up the state-controlled oil
company Petrobras into individual business units, and set profit
targets for government appointed executives in each
department.10 9
By 1999 the Brazilian government awarded twelve territorial
110
blocks to fourteen companies representing six countries.
Within one year, that number nearly doubled to twenty-one
blocks coming from eight new operators.11 1 To further
encourage foreign investment, Brazil allows foreign oil and gas
112
companies to keep their accounts in foreign currencies.
Reforming Petrobras allowed the government to place twentyeight percent of voting stock in the company on local and

The ANP, an integral entity of the indirect Federal Administration, subject to
special agency regime, as a regulatory body for the petroleum industry,
affiliated to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, is hereby created.
Id. art. 7, translated in [2 Doing Business in Brazil] Law No. 9478 of Aug. 6, 1997 (Juris
Publishing, Inc.) App. 2S, at 4 (Aug. 1997). Article 72 provides in pertinent part:
II. Private refineries are obliged to submit to the ANP an investment plan
aimed at technological update and expansion of their refining capacity, in
view of their increase of production and consequent reduction of subsidies;
II. The ANP shall periodically evaluate the level of competitiveness of each
private refinery and the achievement of their investment plan and the
consequent reduction of related subsidies.
Id. art. 72(II)-(III), translated in [2 Doing Business in Brazil] Law No. 9478 of Aug. 6,
1997 (Juris Publishing, Inc.) App. 2S, at 18 (Aug. 1997).
109. See id., arts. 63-64, translated in [2 Doing Business in Brazil] Law No. 9478 of
Aug. 6, 1997 (Juris Publishing, Inc.) App. 2S, at 17 (Aug. 1997) (Art. 63: "Petrobrds and
its subsidiaries are hereby authorized to establish consortiums with national or foreign
companies, whether as the leader company or not, with the purpose of expanding
activities, increasing its technologies and enlarging investments in the petroleum
industry"; Art. 64: "For the strict compliance of the its corporate objectives, which are
integral to the petroleum industry, Petrobrd.s is authorized to establish subsidiaries
which may associate, either on a majority or minority basis, with other companies."); see
alsoJohn Barham, Petrobras'sMakeover Man, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 2000, at 2 (highlighting
the Petrobras CEO's modern business approach towards the company).
110. See Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, supra note 101, at 163 (describing the extent of
foreign activity in Brazil's oil sector in 1999); see also Energy and International Law:
Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at 63 (examining the effects four
years after the Petrobras reform).
11. See Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, supra note 101, at 163 (describing the extent of
foreign activity in Brazil's by year-end 1999); see also Energy and International Law:
Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at 63 (examining the effects four
years after the Petrobras reform).
112. See Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, supra note 101, at 164 (describing legislation to
further induce foreign companies to invest in Brazil's oil sector); see also Energy and
International Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, supra note 10, at 63
(highlighting an example by the Brazilian government to further attract FDI).
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international markets, and Petrobras is now listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. 113 The legislation successfully helped Brazil
become more self-sufficient in its oil production, and Petrobras
114
continues to make headlines with its large oil discoveries.
C. FDIExpropriationRisk Illustrated in Venezuela
While constitutional reform is a crucial first step to attract
foreign investors, protecting their investments abroad is perhaps
the most important concern. Foreign companies looking to
invest in another country's oil sector typically negotiate long-term
contracts, and provide a large proportion of the business
investment upfront."5 These high sunk costs can be particularly
vulnerable to expropriation once a large proportion of the
private investor's assets are within the borders of a foreign
government.'1 6 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's heavily
publicized national goal for "Full Energy Sovereignty" illustrates
this inherent risk with FDI in the oil sector. 117 While President
Chavez's national plan poses a dangerous scenario for foreign
companies, a number of them had previously negotiated
contractual provisions to mitigate the economic risk in the event
of expropriation by the Venezuelan government."I

113. See Barham, supra note 109, at 2 (illustrating the scope of Petrobras'
capitalization efforts); see also Rosado de Sa Ribeiro, supra note 101, at 150 (describing
the public and private characteristics to the Petrobras company).
114. See Barham, supra note 109, at 2 (noting the CEO of Petrobras' assessment that
Petrobras could become self-sufficient by 2005); see also Miller, supra note 18, at 843
(providing examples of long-term investments that will achieve Brazil's goal of selfsufficiency in its oil sector).
115. See Brandon Marsh, Preventing the Inevitable: The Benefits of Contractual Risk
Engineeringin Light of Venezuela's Recent Oil Field Nationalization, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
453, 454 (2008) (explaining that energy production contracts typically require long-term
investments); see also B. Seth McNew, "Full Sovereignty Over Oil": A Discussion of Venezuelan
Oil Policy and Possible Consequences of Recent Changes, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 149, 155
(2008) (examining the effects of increased government regulation by the Venezuelan
government on foreign oil companies with large investments).
116. See infra notes 119-120, and accompanying text.
117. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 454 (detailing the financial structure of the
contracts that foreign companies negotiated prior to the threat of expropriation by the
Venezuelan government); see also McNew, supra note 115, at 153-54 (examining
Venezuela's recent measures to further increase government control in the oil sector).
118. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 463-65 (detailing the contractual provisions
designed to protect FDI in Venezuela's oil sector); see also Erik J. Woodhouse, The
Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing
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Long-term contracts that require a large initial investment
provide a number of challenges for contract drafters negotiating
foreign oil projects because there is a heightened risk of
expropriation by the host government." 9 Once an investor has
made a proportionally large investment into the host country's
infrastructure, the host country obtains increased financial
leverage to renegotiate for more beneficial terms, or to simply
breach the entire contract.1 2 ° This is known as an "obsolescing
bargain" because the host government's increased bargaining
power makes
the previously negotiated contract terms essentially
"obsolete." 2 ' In the 1990s, the Venezuelan government was
negotiating thirty-year concession contracts with foreign oil
companies to develop and produce Venezuela's oil.122 By 2000,
newly elected Democratic-Socialist President Hugo Chavez
renegotiated the terms of those contracts to obtain a majority
stake in the oil sector by threatening to expropriate the
industry.'2 3 These "renegotiated" terms raised taxes and royalties,
and increased the market share of Venezuela's state-owned oil
124
company, Petr6leos de Venezuela, in their country's oil sector.
Foreign companies must anticipate these situations to
insulate themselves from further risk. For example, foreign
Countries, 38 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 121, 127-28 (2006) (examining various IPP models
from developing countries to best reduce the risk of expropriation).
119. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 457 (explaining the increased risk of
expropriation in high sunk cost investment models); see also Woodhouse, supranote 118,
at 127 (observing that foreign investments in infrastructure projects pose heightened
risk of expropriations).
120. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 457 (stating how host countries are placed in an
advantageous position after high-sunk-cost investments are made); see also Woodhouse,
supra note 118, at 127 (describing a host country's increased financial leverage during
the early stages of a high sunk investment project).
121. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 457 (defining the obsolescing bargain theory); see
also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 127 (explaining concept of obsolescing bargain).
122. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 454 (describing the Venezuelan government's
negotiations with foreign investors prior to the election of President Chavez); see also
McNew, supra note 115, at 151-52 (explaining that prior FDI agreements led to foreign
companies gaining a majority share in some of Venezuela's most lucrative oil reserves).
123. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 454 (summarizing the contract terms
renegotiated in the Venezuelan government's favor); see also McNew, supra note 115, at
153-54 (addressing President Chavez's plan to regain majority control over Venezuela's
most profitable oil reserves).
124. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 453-54 (describing the actions taken by the
Venezuelan government after President Chavez took office); see also McNew, supra note
115, at 149-50 (describing the consequences of President Chavez's oil nationalization
plan).
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companies investing in Venezuela's oil sector contracted
maximum price levels to discourage the Venezuelan government
from expropriating if oils prices rose too high.' 25 These
companies also typically negotiate a baseline price to prevent
governmental interference if pressured to increase their shortterm revenues when oil prices drop.' 26 In conjunction with
setting price levels, companies can use a host country's foreign
assets as collateral in the event that the host government seeks to
expropriate. 127 This gives debt-holders access to oil exports to
recoup their loans, and provides security in financing large
projects in foreign countries.1 2 Lastly, foreign companies can
make explicit provisions for offshore international arbitration to
settle their dispute in a neutral setting, and enforce an award
29
using the host country's foreign assets and export revenues.
D. FDI Protection Under NAFTA
Expropriating foreign enterprises without adequate
compensation is the biggest risk to foreign investors, and a
serious impediment to foreign investment in developing
countries. 3 ° The United States and other industrialized countries
responded to this fear by establishing bilateral and multilateral

125. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 465-66 (explaining how price control provisions
discourage expropriation); see also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 171-72 (discussing the
common contractual provisions in an IPP investment agreement).
126. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 466 (describing how price control provisions are
designed to discourage expropriation); see also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 171-72
(illustrating the common contractual provisions in an IPP investment agreement).
127. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 466 (demonstrating how foreign investors are
compensated if their investment is expropriated); see also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at
175 (illustrating how an expropriating government may find it difficult to escape
payment of award ruled against them).
128. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 466-67 (explaining how foreign assets of a host
country can be used as collateral to persuade creditors to finance large international
investment projects); see also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 175 (listing types of secure
payment provision that may be used in an international investment contract).
129. See Marsh, supra note 115, at 467 (explaining how international arbitration
allows foreign investors to bring their claims in a neutral environment and recover an
award from an expropriating country); see also Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 181
(noting that private investors are gravitating towards offshore international arbitration
to settle dispute with foreign governments).
130. See Homant, supra note 14, at 251 (addressing how concerns over
expropriation led to international investment treaties; see also Sandrino, supa note 38, at
315-16 (addressing the United States' concern over protecting foreign investments).
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investment treaties to protect their foreign investments."' These
international treaties provide an enhanced degree of certainty on
the rules governing foreign investment, and empower foreign
a host
investors to enforce their contractual rights against
132
country through international arbitration proceedings. NAjTA
is a multilateral treaty between Mexico, the United States, and
Canada designed to encourage free trade, promote fair
33
competition, and increase foreign investment in the region.1
Given Mexico's historically hostile position towards FDI, 134 their
ratification of NAFTA is an important first step to minimize a
foreign investor's fear of expropriation without adequate
compensation.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA sets the legal standards for the
treatment of foreign investors from other NAFTA countries, and
allows investors to settle disputes with a host country in
international arbitration.1 35 In accordance with traditional
principles of international law, chapter 11 declares that host
countries may not expropriate investments unless for a public
purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, under due process of law,
131. See Robbins, supra note 23, at 404 (explaining how international investment
treaties encourage foreign investment into developing countries); Sandrino, supra note
38, at 316 (providing the policy rational behind international investment treaties).
132. See Robbins, supra note 23, at 404, 414 (discussing the reasons why countries
create investment treaties); see also Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 LAW &
Bus. REv. AM. 501, 504-05 (2002) (explaining why international investment treaties have
proliferated in recent years).
133. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 102(1)(a)-(c), U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 102 states:
Objectives:
1. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically
through its principles and rules, including national treatment, mostfavored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the
Parties;
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of
the Parties...
Id.
134. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
135. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 86-87 (explaining the purpose of NAFTA
chapter 11); see also Gregory M. Starner, Taking a ConstitutionalLook: Chapter 11 as an
Extension of Member States' ConstitutionalProtection of Property, 33 LAW POL'Y INT'L BUS. 405,
418-19 (2002) (introducing the dispute resolution protections of NAFTA under chapter
11).
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and with fair compensation.' 3 6 The principle characteristic of
customary international law is the actual conduct of nation-states
in their international relations. 3 7 This conduct is often found in
official diplomatic communications, which nations implicitly
consent to through practice.13 s Western laissez-faire ideas and
liberal concepts of property developing towards the end of the
nineteenth century prompted industrializing nations to establish
international standards to protect the investments of their
nationals abroad. 139 As a result, customary international law of
expropriation developed in favor of protecting the private
property of aliens and to restrict a host state interference with
40
private property.
Several Latin American countries consider the traditional
rules of customary international law to be a vestige of
imperialism, and oppose them on the belief that they would
impede their ability to carry out necessary reforms during an
economic crisis. 4 1 Alternatively, these countries adhere to the
Calvo Doctrine, which allows their domestic courts to determine
136. NAFTA, supranote 133, art. 1110(1). Article 1110(1) states:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on
payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6").
137. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 55-56
(1984) (discussing the development of customary international law); see also VAGTS,
DETLEV, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
PROBLEMS 62-63 (4th ed. 2008) (providing examples of customary international law).
138. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 55-56
(1984); see also VAGTS, DETLEV, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 62-63 (4th ed. 2008).
139. See Sandrino, supra note 38, at 265-66 (explaining how the global politicaleconomic framework has molded expropriation standards over time); see also Samuel
KB. Asante, InternationalLaw and ForeignInvestment: A Reappraisal,37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
588, 590 (1988) (describing how customary international expropriation standards
developed from the law of State responsibility for injury to aliens and their alien
property).
140. See Sandrino, supra note 38, at 265-66; see also Samuel KB. Asante, International
Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal,37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 588, 590 (1988).
141. See Robbins, supra note 23, at 410-11 (perceiving the political opposition to
customary international standards of law); see also Sandrino, supra note 38, at 319
(explaining why Latin American countries oppose customary international law
standards).
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the value of compensation.142 Domestic courts typically protect
foreign investments only to the extent that they protect their own
citizenry, which often falls below the standards set by customary
143
international law.
Article 1110 in chapter 11 of NAFTA explicitly provides for
adequate compensation, without delay, equal to the fair market
value, with interest, at the time of the expropriation. 144 This
represents an important change from Mexico's longstanding
policy of expropriating foreign property under the Calvo
in Mexico's
Doctrine, which is implicitly referenced
constitution. 145 NAFTA's dispute resolution mechanism also

142. See Sandrino, supra note 38, at 319 (laying out the rationale for adopting the
Calvo Clause); see also Starner, supra note 135, at 432 (explaining that Mexico recognizes
solving disputes with NAFTA member states through international arbitration under
chapter 11).
143. See Robbins, supra note 23, at 410 (explaining the difference between
customary standards of international law and the Calvo Clause); see also Sandrino, supra
note 38, at 319 (comparing the provisions in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution with
NAFTA, chapter 11).
144. NAFTA, supra note 133, art. 1110(1)-(4). Article 1110 states in specific:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6").
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place
("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occurring
because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation
criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including declared tax
value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market value.
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.
4. If payment is made in a G7 currency, compensation shall include interest at
a commercially reasonable rate for that currency from the date of
expropriation until the date of actual payment.
Id. art. 1110.
145. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution reads that "the Nation shall carry out
the exploitation of these product, consistent with the provisions established in the
respective regulatory law." Const. art. 27 para. 6 (Mex.), translated in [12 Const. of the
Countries of the World] Mex. Const. 3/08, at 21 (Mar. 2008); see also Starner, supra note
135, at 415 (examining the tension between chapter 11 of NAFYA and Mexico's
constitutional framework).
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146
demonstrates Mexico's divergence from the Calvo Doctrine.
Mexico historically required foreign investors to pursue their
legal claims arising in Mexico under Mexican law. 4 7 This allowed
Mexico to establish the "fair value" for expropriation based on its
domestic standards, often resulting in less than the fair market
148
value standard set by customary international law.
Under article 1116 of NAFTA, foreign investors may submit
a claim for arbitration, using applicable rules of international
law, for loss or damage resulting from a breach by the host
country. 149 The most noteworthy arbitration cases filed under
NAFTA analyze the extent to which a host government's activities
constitute an expropriation requiring adequate compensation. 5 0
Pope & Talbot, for example, established a "regulatory taking" as
regulations amounting to interference "sufficiently restrictive"
that the property has been taken from the owner.15 1 Metalclad
Corp. expanded the scope of expropriation to cover indirect and
"creeping expropriation."15' 2 The Metalclad tribunal concluded
that the Mexican government's regulations essentially restricted
the claimant's use and "reasonably-to-be-expected" economic

146. See Sandrino, supra note 38, at 322 (suggesting that Mexico's distrust for
private arbitration is diminishing); see also Homant, supra note 14, at 251 (explaining
how Mexico's indoctrination of the Calvo Clause differs from its recent acquiescence to
internationally recognized FDI protection standards).
147. See Homant, supra note 14, at 251 (citing Mexico's traditional practice of not
recognizing international arbitration as an adequate mechanism to settle disputes
arising in Mexico); see also Starner, supra note 135, at 415 (summarizing Mexico's
investment policies under the Calvo Doctrine).
148. See e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award, 40 I.L.M. 36, 1
116 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000) (alleging that Metalclad's award should be limited to the
cost of state's capitalization efforts in the waste management industry); see also Del Duca,
supra note 36, at 138 (explaining how NAFTA's arbitration provisions protect foreign
investors from discrimination in Mexico's domestic courts).
149. See NAFTA, supra note 133, art. 1116(1) ("An investor of a Party may submit to
arbitration under this Section a claim that another Party has breached an
obligation .... ").
150. See generally C6line L6vesque, DistinguishingExpropriation and Regulation Under
NAFJ'A Chapter 11: Making Explicit the Link to Property, in THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA:
THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA 293 (Kevin C. Kennedy ed., 2004)
(exploring nature of expropriation in NAFTA arbitration); Jessica C. Lawrence, Chicken
Little Revisited: Regulatory NAFTA ExpropriationAfter Methanex, 41 GA. L. REV. 261 (2006)
(same).
151. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 7 ICSID Rep. 69,
102
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
152. See Metalclad, Final Award,
102-03.
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benefit of the property.1 53 In S.D. Myers, however, the arbitral
tribunal refined the scope of expropriations to involve only the
"deprivation of ownership rights," whereas "mere regulations"
represented a lesser interference 54insufficient to constitute a
taking for adequate compensation.1
This line of cases demonstrates the gradual development of
expropriation standards, allowing foreign investors to enter into
host-countries with a greater understanding of the scope of
protection under NAFTA. More importantly, the Metalclad case
illustrates Mexico's acquiescence to independent arbitration for
expropriation disputes.' 55 The arbitration process in Metalclad
prevented the Mexican government's constitutional defense,
under Article 27, that fair value compensation should be limited
to the value Metalclad previously accepted under the Mexican
tax code for tax benefits.'5 6 Metalclad's decision to settle its
dispute under NAFTA chapter 11 arbitration demonstrates that
international arbitration affords a better opportunity for
independent recognition of an investor's claims than a host
country's judicial system.' 5 7 Although this limits the Mexican
government's ability to settle disputes occurring in its country
though its own judicial system, this may ultimately encourage
foreign companies to increase foreign investments in Mexico.
While NAFTA provides uniformity and increased certainty
over expropriation standards that protect FDI, each country has
reserved exceptions for sensitive industries where private
investment is not permitted.'5 8 Not surprisingly, Mexico

153. Id. J 103, 106-07.
282-83
154. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408,
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
155. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 121 (discussing the implications of Metalclad);
see also Starner, supra note 135, at 423-24 (noting Mexico's deference to the tribunal's
ruling in Metalclad).
156. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 138 (explaining how NAFTA's arbitration
mechanism protected Metalclad from any potential discrimination in Mexico's domestic
courts); see also Starner, supra note 135, at 432 (observing that NAFTA arbitral tribunals
apply the NAFTA provisions and international law in lieu of Mexican Law).
157. See Del Duca, supra note 36, at 137 (examining the benefits provided by
chapter 11 arbitration under NAFTA); see also Starner, supra note 135, at 419 (listing the
advantages NAFTA arbitration provides to foreign companies over the Mexican legal
system).
158. See NAFTA, supra note 133, annexes 602.3, 603.6; Homant, supra note 14, at
250 (discussing Mexico's list of exceptions under NAFTA's chapter 6); see also Starner,
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exempted the "strategic areas" in its energy sector described in
the Mexican Constitution."5 9 While it is important to respect the
sovereignty of each country, the signatories should encourage
each other to reach a consensus on these most divisive issues. All
of the countries stand to benefit by seeking uniformity in the
standards and practices established under NAFTA. The burden
should not be borne on Mexico alone; the United States and
Canada are equally culpable for protecting their agricultural and
mining sectors. 160 Understandably, the world financial crisis has
temporarily halted movement in this direction as governments
have placed a higher priority on their struggling domestic
industries.16 1 Nevertheless, international competition from other
regions of the world should inevitably provide an incentive for all
NAFTA parties to devise a mutually beneficial compromise with
respect to these industries, and create the political-economic
space for the Mexican government to reevaluate the benefits of
Pemex's privileged status under the chapter 6 provisions.

supra note 135, at 433 (addressing the implications of the chapter 6 provisions under
NAFTA).
159. See NAFTA supra note 133, annex 602.3(1)(b) (Mexico reserves to itself
"foreign trade; transportation, storage and distribution, up to and including the first
hand sales of ... natural and artificial gas .... "); see also Homant, supra note 14, at 253
(describing Mexico's energy related activities protected under chapter 6 of the NAFTA);
see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 90-91 (listing the Mexico's reservations under NAFTA
chapter 6).
160. See Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, Investor-StateArbitration: Reservations and
Exceptions, in NAFTA LAW AND BUSINESS, Chapter VI 15, 16 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis
Folsom eds., 2000) (explaining the reservations of each NAFTA member state under
chapter 6); see also Hillary E. Maki, Note, Trade Protection vs. Trade Promotion: Are Free
Trade Agreements Good ForAmerican Workers?, 20 NDJ.L. ETHICS & PUB POLY 883, 889, 905
(2006) (describing the United States' protectionist measures towards its steel and
agricultural sectors).
161. See Hi-Taek Shin, Trade, Investment and Dispute Settlement: The Domestic
Decisionmaking Process and Its Implications for International Commitments: American Beef in
Korea, 34 YALEJ. INT'L L. 567, 567 (2009) (illustrating bow globalized economic markets
are susceptible to domestic political pressure); see also Ken Ellingwood, Calderon Reports
Gains in Drug Fight, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at A17 (describing how the Calder6n
administration responded to the global economic crisis with increased public works and
public lending).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEMEX REFORM

President Calder6n has successfully allowed more private
participation in the oil sector without a constitutional fight, 6 2 but
many experts believe the courts will ultimately strike down any
hydrocarbon-related legislation further expanding foreign
participation through risk contracts so long as Articles 27 and 28
of the Constitution remain unchanged.' 6 3 The evolution of
Brazil's state-controlled oil company Petrobras appears to be
viable blueprint for Pemex.'6 4 Following this model will require
coalition building across political parties to (1) amend the
Constitution to take oil related activities outside of the "strategic
areas" exclusive to the Mexican State under Articles 27 and 28,165
and (2) amend NAFTA by rescinding the Mexican oil sector's
privileged status under chapter 6 of NAFTA. 166 In light of the
Mexican oil sector's political and legal restraints to FDI, 167 any
successful Pemex reform will likely depend on the Mexican
government's ability to align the interests of foreign investors,
politicians, and their constituencies. This is politically feasible
only if increased production correlates with increased
government revenue to ease the Mexican people's fear of losing
68
control of Pemex, a symbol of national sovereignty.1
President Zedillo's deregulatory model for the electric
power sector may also provide the government a way to
modernize Mexico's oil sector at a controlled rate, while giving
foreign companies the opportunity to satisfy the public's

162. See supra notes 57-58and accompanying text (explaining the objectives of the
2008 Pemex legislation).
163. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal
consequences of the Mexican Supreme Court's ruling).
164. See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text (providing the three-stage
model for oil reform in Mexico).

165. See supra notes 89-95, 106-107 and accompanying text (assessing the legal
measure required to allow the necessary degree of foreign activity in Mexico's oil sector

to revive Pemex).
166. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text (explaining Mexico's
exemption for "strategic areas" and suggesting the steps Mexico should take under
NAFTA to encourage participation from foreign oil companies in the United States and
Canada).
167. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (explaining the history of and
legal challenges to FDI, and the efforts to remove restrictions on FDI).
168. See supra notes 2-15 and accompanying text (illustrating the Pemex's centrality
to the Mexican economy and society).
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1 69
expectations based on their ability to increase oil production.
This would similarly require three stages: (1) permitting foreign
companies to produce oil and sell directly to the government as
an IPP; 17 (2) allowing foreign companies to sell oil directly to
customers in the wholesale market;17 1 and (3) giving foreign
companies complete control over their activities in specified
territorial blocks that carry tax burdens.172 In the initial phase,
lawmakers could create a state-controlled distribution and
regulatory regime, similar to Petrobras' ANP, to monitor Pemex's
exploration, production, and refining companies. 173 Taking after
the IPP model, foreign investors would then be allowed to
finance their own exploration and production in Mexican
reserves on the condition that they sell the oil they produce at
the rate established by this new regulatory regime. 174 Pursuant to
President Calder6n's initial proposal, companies would retain
ownership over oilrigs and refineries that they construct and
75
finance.1
Mexicans may be concerned that deregulating the oil sector
would lead to the same results of the electric power sector reform
in 1992, where ninety percent of all private investment came
from foreign sources. 176 The majority of private investment in the
oil sector likely will come from foreign entities since
international companies from industrialized nations typically
have the financial resources and technical knowledge to perform
these sophisticated contracts. 177 This is an unavoidable
169. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (providing a method to ease
political anxiety over foreign activity in Mexico's oil sector).
170. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (applying the IPP model used in the
power electric sector to the oil sector).
171. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (applying President Fox's power
electric reform proposal to the oil sector).
172. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (referring to Petrobras' current
regulatory regime governing foreign activity in their oil sector).
173. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (recommending that the Pemex
create a regulatory regime after Brazil's ANP to regulate the Mexican oil sector's gradual
opening to foreign companies).
174. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (adapting the first stage of oil reform
after the IPP model in Mexico's power electricity sector).
175. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (referring to President Clader6n's
original refinery ownership provision left out of the October 2008 Pemex legislation).
176. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (addressing concerns that a
proliferation of FDI in the oil sector will threaten Mexico's economic sovereignty).
177. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (describing the general flow of
FDI from wealthy industrialized countries to less developed countries).
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consequence that most developing countries must face when a
state-run monopoly controls a complex sector of the economy for
multiple decades. 7 ' Host governments can protect themselves by
requiring foreign companies to train local employees and place
them in sophisticated technical positions.'79 This would protect
Mexico's oil sector in the event foreign companies no longer see
a profit incentive to remain in Mexico, potentially leaving Pemex
ill-trained and undercapitalized. These provisions would enable
Pemex to retain some of the technical expertise needed to
stabilize an economic shift in the Mexico's oil sector.
Expropriation risks in the foreign oil sector always loom
80
when a project requires a large amount of financing upfront.'
Foreign companies can protect their investments through
contractual
provisions
designed
to
discourage
future
expropriations by including clear provisions for international
arbitration, and using international assets as collateral against
future expropriations. 8 ' However, as the case in Venezuela
demonstrates, the risk of entering a politically volatile oil sector
with a history of prior expropriations may still discourage oil
companies, which are hesitant to invest substantial resources in
large projects on foreign soil.'8 2 The Mexican government's
willingness to settle disputes within an internationally recognized
process under NAFTA should provide some assurance for
concerned foreign investors. 8 3 However, the reservations
granted in chapter 6 still pose a barrier to reaching the goals of
encouraging free trade and fair competition among NAIFTA
signatories.' 8 4 If the Mexican government is dedicated to

178. See supra note 10-11 and accompanying text (noting the downside to statecontrolled monopolies).
179. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (listing the potential downsides to
FDI).
180. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (explaining why FDI in the oil
sector has an increased expropriation risk).
181. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (summarizing the key
contractual provision designed to protect FDI from expropriation).
182. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (noting the inherent risk of
expropriation in political unstable countries).
183. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (explaining Mexico's gradual
acceptance of standards set by international customary law while distancing themselves
from the provisions outlined in the Calvo Doctrine).
184. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (providing the Mexican
government's decision to preserve their oil sectors privileged status under NAFTA).
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attracting FDI in the oil sector, then it must remove the oil
sector's privileged status under chapter 6 of NAFTA.
If the Mexican government is satisfied with the success of
the initial oil reform stage, it could advance to the second
proposed stage that creates a regulatory framework to facilitate
an open, competitive wholesale oil market, as former President
Fox proposed for the electric power sector in 2001.85 In the
third and final stage of reform the Mexican government, through
its newly created regulatory regime, would begin granting
specified territorial blocks to foreign companies to explore,
produce, and sell the oil directly to the market.186 This privilege
would be coupled with taxes and export tariffs to sustain the
incoming revenue that the government would receive from the
sale of Mexican oil. 8 7 Following the lead of Petrobras, shares in
Pemex could eventually become publicly traded to alleviate some
of the Mexican government's financial burden on the oil sector,
while still allowing the Mexican government to own the majority
Allowing some of Pemex's equity to be
of the voting shares.'
bought by private investors would also encourage the Mexican
government to maximize profits for its shareholders, which
would also be in line with the interests of the Mexican people if
increased profits also result in increased revenue for the
government to provide social services. Of course all of these steps
would depend on the success of incremental reform, contingent
on the cooperation between the Mexican government and
foreign private investors.
The Supreme Court's decision to invalidate President Fox's
2001 decree puts the legality of virtually any private activity in
8 9 While this is a serious
Mexico's energy sector into question."
barrier to further privatization reform in the energy sector,
investors might take comfort in the Court's autonomy to rule
185. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (using President Fox's energy reform
proposal as the model for the second stage of Pemex reform).
186. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (recommending that Pemex model
after Petrobras' oil sector in the proposed third reform stage).
187. See id. (explaining why the Petrobras model allows the Mexican government to
sustain a revenue stream from oil sales while deregulating the sector).
188. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (citing Petrobras' presence in the
stock exchange as a method for the Mexican government to reduce its financial
obligations in the oil sector by the third reform stage).
189. See supra note 89-95 and accompanying text (noting the constitutional barriers
restricting foreign companies from operating in Mexico's energy sector).
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against the President on a major political issue.' 90 For example, if
a reactionary administration began to view NAFTA as a threat to
Mexican sovereignty, the administration could try to abandon
NAFTA and revert to re-nationalization policies. 19' In the event of
such volatile change in Mexico's political landscape, the courts
may be seen as one source of stability. More autonomy within the
judicial branch should provide greater legitimacy in the eyes of
prospective foreign investors.
Yet the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 27 calls
into question the constitutionality of the electric power sector's
entire deregulatory scheme.' 9 2 It appears that only a
constitutional amendment taking oil outside of the "strategic
areas" exclusive to the Mexican state will establish a stable legal
environment to attract foreign companies to Mexico's oil
sector. 193
CONCLUSION
The long-term solution to Pemex's financial problems
ultimately depends on its ability to reach oil reserves in the
deepest waters in the Gulf of Mexico, but the company has little
experience exploring these areas.194 The October 2008
legislation allowed Pemex to hire foreign companies to explore
and produce oil with incentive-based contracts, but companies
are restricted from owning the oil or their facilities.' 9 Private
companies are likely not willing to partner with Pemex in the
deepwater explorations projects only as a service company if they

190. See id. (demonstrating that that while the Supreme Court's ruling jeopardizes
the legality of foreign activity in the energy sector, it also appears to be a more stable
institution for legal change).
191. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (citing Venezuela's oil
nationalization regime as a worst-case scenario for foreign investors).
192. See supra notes 91- 94 and accompanying text (restating the legal effect of the
Supreme Courts interpretation of Article 27 in the Mexican Constitution).
193. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (suggesting that only a constitutional
amendment will provide the legal certainties for foreign investors looking to invest in
Mexico's oil sector).
194. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (illustrating the important role
foreign companies can play to modernize Mexico's oil sector).
195. See supra notes 57-56 and accompanying text (explaining the limited scope of
new activity permitted to foreign companies under the October 2008 Pemex legislation).
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must also bear a significant financial burden without ownership
196
rights.
Pemex's fate will impact the future of the entire country.19 7
If the government is serious in reforming Pemex it will need to
amend Articles 27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution. 9 ' This
will be an incredible challenge for politicians. Mexico no longer
has a dominant political party, making constitutional changewhich requires consensus building across distinct political
parties-notably more difficult. 99 Still, there is great potential to
restore this once thriving company back to prosperity, give the
Mexican government increased legitimacy, and ensure the
livelihood of the Mexican people.

196. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (summarizing how President
Calder6n's initial reform proposal was based on the notion that foreign companies need
increased incentives to participate in Mexico's oil sector).
197. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining Pemex's important
role in the Mexican economy and society at large).
198. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (reflecting on the possibilities of
energy reform after the Mexican Supreme Court's ruling in Constitutional Controversy
22/2001).
199. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (describing the political process
required to amend the Mexican Constitution).

